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THE IMPACT OF EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE CHANGES ON UNITED STATES -EUROPEAN RELATIONS

BACKGROUND
The leaders of post World War II Europe found their countries devastated from years of conflict. The reconstruction of entire social, political and military systems could overwhelm the delicate economic condition that existed in post World War II Europe. The consensus among progressive governments was that countries must band together for the common good of a common Europe. This meant that countries with strained and sometimes bloody relationships had to put aside their differences and face the new challenges that were ahead. Not only did the leaders have to face the daunting challenges of rebuilding Europe but also the expansionist policies of the Soviet Union. Unlike the Western Allies, the Soviet Union continued to occupy land and maintain an army at full wartime strength. The Soviet presence preoccupied leaders on both sides of the Atlantic for nearly five decades.
The United States did not want the conditions that existed after World War I to exist in post World War II Europe. Many thought that the economic, political and social turmoil that existed after World War I were the root causes that lead directly to the conditions that triggered
World War II. The United States and Europe recognized that Europe could not recover alone and that disaster would strike Europe again without American aid. Another concern was the political and economic environment that was a breading ground for the spread of the new menace, Communism.
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Through the Marshall plan, the United States spent billions of dollars on the reconstruction effort of Europe. For many years, the United States and Europe shared the common interests and goals of Soviet containment, mutual security, and prosperity for both sides of the Atlantic.
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Although there exists hundred of treaties between the United States with dozens of European organizations, this paper will examine the security arrangements between the United
States and the three major security organizations in Europe. A brief historical background and status of the Western European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the European Union will be helpful in understanding the complexities of the changing security arrangements within Europe. Figure 1 graphically depicts the member states of these organizations.
FIGURE 1 MEMBER STATES OF EUROPEAN ORGANIZATIONS. THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
The Western European Union (WEU) was created by the Treaty on Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-defense, as amended by the Paris Protocol in 1954.
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The Brussels Treaty was in response to the Soviet Union's aggressive posture to control the countries of Central Europe, and as such was the first attempt to form a united Europe. The
Treaty's main feature was the commitment to the mutual defense should any of the Member States be attacked. A military plan initiated in the framework of the Brussels Treaty
Organization for the common defense was adopted in 1948, involving the integration of air defenses and a joint command organization. The WEU has been involved in actual military operations other than war (MOOTW) for the past decade. These humanitarian/peace support operation missions were derived from the crisis management tasks that are at the core of the European common security and defense policy and known as the Petersberg Tasks.
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The United States, although not a member, has had a solid working relationship with the WEU. Through it's permanent seat on the joint WEU-NATO Council, the United States wielded a certain amount of influence. The WEU, for its' part, has been a staunch supporter of NATO and has been instrumental in strengthening the European pillar of the North Atlantic Alliance. The economic motive rested on the argument that larger markets would promote increased competition and thus lead to higher productivity and standards of living. Economic and political viewpoints merged, in the assumption that economic strength was the basis of political and military power, and that a fully integrated European economy would make conflict between European nations less likely.
The members of the EU cooperate in three areas, often referred to as pillars. At the heart of this system is the European Commission pillar with its governing institutions. The European Commission pillar is flanked by two pillars focused on intergovernmental cooperation: Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). These two pillars are a result of the Maastricht agreement to develop closer cooperation in these areas.
The CFSP and JHA pillars are based entirely on intergovernmental cooperation, and decisions have to be made unanimously. CFSP is a forum for foreign policy discussions, declarations, and common actions that work toward developing a security and defense policy. It has successfully developed positions on a range of issues and has established some common policy actions.
The EU is currently made up of fifteen member and thirteen candidate states and has expanded beyond its' economic and common market beginnings into the development of foreign policy and military capabilities. With its origin, as a purely economic organization, the EU has evolved into a political, economic and military organization sometimes in direct competition with the United States. Because of this, the United States relationship with the EU has been tentative at best. There have been numerous confrontations between both sides of the Atlantic and, although mostly economic in nature, there has been increasing friction between the two based on American policies towards the Middle East.
EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY
The development of the European Security and Defense Identity ( Foreign and Security Policy.
13
NATO members agreed that ESDI should be built within the NATO structure, supported by the NATO military planning system, and to support the development of a military force utilizing NATO assets and capabilities operating under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU. 14 As in the past, the WEU would work within NATO to strengthen the transatlantic link.
In 1998 
EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY
For the EU, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) appears to be the next logical step in the realization of influential involvement on the international stage. 17 The AngloFrench Summit at St. Malo, in December 1998, and the Helsinki Declaration that same year, set in motion the process aimed at generating the means and political will for the EU to become an international player in the foreign policy and security realm. ESDP provides the EU with a common security policy that covers all matters relating to its security -i.e., ESDP forms part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This common defense policy would lead to the common defense if the decision was adopted and ratified by the member states.
ESDP commits member nations to an ambitious program for building a rapid reaction force at the corps level. The EU established a headline goal for the structure of its new military force. The goal was to have a sixty thousand-man deployable force, an expansion in airlift and sealift and mechanisms for directing military and diplomatic operations in place by 2003.
Supporting this force would require a manpower pool in excess of one hundred and twenty thousand personnel from the contributing member states. This force will be capable of executing missions across the spectrum of conflict, and in accordance with the Peterburg Tasks delineated in Bonn in 1992. These tasks include humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping, and crisis management.
18 Additionally, the EU recognized the United Nations Security Council's primary responsibility concerning international peacekeeping and global security.
From the beginning, the United States supported ESDP, although with skepticism as to the ability of EU member nations to be able to actualize the force generation and modernization requirements. The United States was also concerned that redundant institutions would reduce capabilities needed for the restructuring of NATO. During that same period, the EU began using the term ESDP, vice ESDI, when describing future European defense and security. The difference between the two initiatives is that ESDP refers to a European-only military force separate from NATO.
The most recent European Council meetings have supported the desire of the EU to have the capability of an autonomous force to act in crisis management, where NATO has decided not to engage. These actions will comply with the United Nations Charter and acknowledges the authority of the United Nations Security Council.
Europe's defense needs have changed, and the EU has made the decision to take responsibility for its security arrangements into its own hands. The EU has therefore decided that it should be capable not only of acting independently in crisis management but also of intervening to prevent conflict. This step supports the goal of the EU not only to be responsible for economic and political stability, but also for the defense and security of Europe.
Currently the ESDP is progressing, however significant challenges are being faced by the member states. The required increases in defense funding levels to implement ESDP and associated programs are significantly taxing the already strained European economies.
Member nations are facing the task of balancing social needs with the security requirements of their nations. These choices are made even more difficult in light of the amount of current EU member deficit spending.
There is some good news on the development of ESDP. There has been some positive movement in NATO -EU cooperation and the ongoing working relationship. There are now modalities in place between the two organizations that allow the exchange of information on defense and security. Although these arrangements are currently at the working level, progress is being made and it is anticipated that regular senior level meetings between the organizations are likely in the near future.
The United States has initially endorsed the development ESDP but is waiting until 2004 when a more detailed assessment of the policy is due to be released to fully support this initiative. • A pool of land, air and maritime combat forces to be employed under a Combined Joint Task Force HQ, • Supported by NATO's collective assets,
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NATO RESPONSE FORCE
• Trained and equipped to common standards set by the Strategic Commands,
• Capable of being tailored to mission, readily deployable on short notice and over long distances, • Combat ready and technically superior to any possible adversary,
• Capable of fighting in an NBC environment, and
• Self-sustainable for a certain period of time.
In essence:
• A response force that allows European and US forces to fight together whenever and wherever the Alliance political authorities decide to, • A force that will set a standard for all NATO forces in the medium and long term."
25
Although the NATO Reaction Force is in the early planning stages, there seems to be enough support and momentum within the Alliance that this initiative should be a reality in the next few years. The main hurdle for the full consensus will be the perceived competition with the European Union's Rapid Reaction Force for assets and capabilities.
EUROPEAN RAPID REACTION FORCE
One of the priorities of the EU has been to develop and introduce civil and military resources and capabilities to make and implement decisions on the full range of conflictprevention and crisis management as defined in the "Petersberg Tasks". 26 The Amsterdam Treaty codified the decision by the EU to develop an autonomous military capability; to act where/when NATO decided not to engage, and to conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. The EU felt that developing an autonomous military capability would strengthen the Common Foreign and Security Policy that represents the EU's underlying defense and security principles. To that end, the EU developed the headline goal of being able to deploy forces of up to corps level (sixty thousand men) within sixty days and sustain them for at least one-year. This force is commonly known as the European Union Rapid Reaction Force (EURRF). The EURRF is to be self-sustaining with the necessary command, control, intelligence capabilities, logistics and, as required, air and maritime assets. The EU also decided to rapidly develop collective capability goals, particularly in the field of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport. At the same time, the EU was encouraging the countries that have applied for membership to the EU, and the non-EU European members of NATO, to contribute to improving Europe's military capabilities.
Once the appropriate political and military structures are in place, the goal in 2003 is to exercise control and strategic management of an EU-led operation, in line with the Petersberg Tasks. The EU has also identified the need to further improve the availability, deployability, sustainability, and interoperability of these forces in order to support the most demanding Petersberg missions. The EU feels that it remains essential to the credibility and effectiveness of ESDP that its military capabilities for crisis management be reinforced so that the EU is in a position to intervene, either with or without access to NATO assets.
The EURRF is also facing significant challenges. The Headline Goal of an operational sixty thousand-man force will not make the 2003 milestone. Member states have found that it will be nearly impossible to train and re-equip the additional troops needed to support that force.
Another issue is the implementation of a multinational force and the structure to support that force. The complexity of consensus makes this development process even more complex and cumbersome.
DEFENSE CAPABILITIES INITIATIVE/PRAGUE CAPABILITIES COMMITMENT
The NATO Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) was the direct result of the huge technological differences that were identified between the United States and Europe during the Kosovo campaign in 1999. 27 European forces could not match the American capabilities in precision munitions, surveillance, and stealth technology. Additionally the lack of strategic lift, combined with an immature logistic infrastructure further resulted in a slow and difficult deployment for the Europeans into the Kosovo region.
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DCI was launched during the NATO's 50th Anniversary Summit held at Washington during April 1999. The focus of DCI is on Alliance capabilities in the following five overlapping areas:
• "Mobility and Deployability": the ability to deploy forces quickly to where they are needed, including areas outside Alliance territory; • "Sustainability": the ability to maintain and supply forces far from their home bases and to ensure that sufficient fresh forces are available for long-duration operations;
• "Effective Engagement": the ability to successfully engage an adversary in all types of operations, from high to low intensity;
• "Survivability": the ability to protect forces and infrastructure against current and future threats; and • "Interoperable Communications": command, control, and information systems that are compatible with each other, to enable forces from different countries to work effectively together.
Within these five overlapping areas, fifty-eight specific capability enhancements have been proposed. These capabilities identified with the purpose to contribute to the development of ESDI, by strengthening European defense capabilities and the European pillar of NATO, with a view to enabling the European allies to make a stronger and more coherent contribution to NATO.
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While the DCI has contributed some improvements, progress has been slow and erratic. • "Defense against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks;
• Secure command communications and information superiority;
• Improvements in interoperability of deployed forces and key aspects of combat effectiveness;
• Rapid deployment and sustainment of combat forces." "Approve the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) as part of the continuing Alliance effort to improve and develop new military capabilities for modern warfare in a high threat environment. Individual Allies have made firm and specific political commitments to improve their capabilities in the areas of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defence; intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition; air-to-ground surveillance; command, control and communications; combat effectiveness, including precision guided munitions and suppression of enemy air defences; strategic air and sea lift; air-to-air refuelling; and deployable combat support and combat service support units. Our efforts to improve capabilities through the PCC and those of the European Union to enhance European capabilities through the European Capabilities Action Plan should be mutually reinforcing, while respecting the autonomy of both organisations, and in a spirit of openness."
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The major difference between the PCC and DCI is the identification of more specific capabilities and the assumption of individual nation states as the "lead agency" for developing and fielding a specific capability. For example, Germany has taken on the responsibility to develop and field the shortage identified in the Alliances' strategic airlift capability. The Netherlands has assumed the lead in the development of precision guided munitions, and Spain is working on improving the air to air refueling shortages within the Alliance. The belief is that with specific nations assuming specific identified shortages in capabilities; advances in reducing the capabilities gap will be accomplished faster and in a less costly manner. The effort of the United States to eradicate terrorist organizations worldwide will not be successful without the support of our European allies and other allies throughout the world.
ANALYSIS
THE THREAT
Changes in the threat to Europe have served as the primary reason for the changes to the region's security architecture. The fall of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact had a profound effect on the European outlook toward security in the region; gone are the days of the Soviet Union mounting an enormous mechanized attack through the gap into the heart of Europe. The requirements to maintain large standing armies that expend huge amounts of national resources, at least for the near future, are gone. The future threat requires security structures that are light, agile, self-sustaining, highly mobile, and capable of power projection beyond the region; everything the old Cold War structures were not. The European Security and Defense Initiative, the European Security and Defense Policy, NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative, the Prague Capabilities Commitment, the NATO Response Force and the European Union's Rapid Reaction Force all reflect changing security initiatives to combat the future threat.
The purpose of these initiatives is to keep the proposing institution relevant, effective and are the natural evolution from the Cold War mentality to a mentality that meets the new and developing threats.
AMERICAN VS EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE
The United States looks at the world in a global light and expects Europe (collectively) to do the same. The rational for this expectation is based upon the fact that Europe's population and gross domestic product equals that of the United States and that Europe wants to be a international military power. Although Europe, through the European Union is definitely a global economic powerhouse, most European leaders view their military interests regionally.
Despite the collective potential, European leaders recognize the lack of a collective military capability necessary to shape international affairs and that will preclude a global vision. The key to global security from a European perspective is to maintain the status quo. They see potential adversities that could threaten the security of Europe deterred due to American military superiority. This view is contrary to that of the United States.
THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
The WEU in cooperation with NATO authored the European Security and Defense
Initiative, which was the first step in European self-defense The United States relationship with the WEU through NATO was extremely strong. The WEU for its part was a strong supporter of NATO and was committed to the ideal of strengthening the European Pillar of the Alliance.
During the past decade, this changed somewhat; the WEU had become the proxy for the EU in the development of a European security and defense plan or initiatives. When the WEU transferred the responsibility directly to the EU, the relationship between the WEU and NATO essentially became non-existent. The expected continuation of ESDI was the direct transfer to the EU. This was not to happen. With the development of the ESDP, ESDI became a moot point.
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
As Lord Ismay, the Alliance's first Secretary General said, the North Atlantic Alliance was intended to keep the Soviets out, the Americans in and the Germans down. Creating the environment that fostered peace and security for the entire continent, NATO successfully prevented conflict and by all standards is the most successful alliance in history. For over fifty years, NATO has been the dominant security organization in Europe and will continue to be for the near future. With the fall of the Soviet Union, NATO now faces the issue of relevance in the New World order. What began as a purely military alliance for the mutual defense of Europe against the expansionist policies of the Soviet Union was for the first time in its history searching for a mission. Both sides of the Atlantic felt that the huge Cold-War era military structure, the backbone of the Alliance, was outdated and obsolete.
The United States has been and remains the largest single contributor to the Alliance. For their part, the Europeans have largely enjoyed peace and security at the expense of the Americans. With the fall of the Wall, the United States has intensified pressure on the European members of the Alliance to share more of the burden for the security of Europe.
Burden sharing
For years, the United States complained that the European allies do not pay their fair share of the military costs of the Alliance. Even prior to the Soviet Union's pledge to withdraw substantial numbers of combat troops from Eastern Europe in 1988, the term "burden shedding" was used to describe the action take by the European Allies. 
Capabilities gap
The war in Kosovo drove home the undeniable reality that Europe is a mere junior partner when it comes to contributing to its own defense. would also relieve the European perception of its serving as a second class actor, thus reducing the friction within the Alliance. However, the major problem with DCI was its overly broad scope. Intending to be more focused in scope and specific in capabilities, the PCC initiative has replaced DCI. The Commitment is intended to streamline capabilities building among the European allies and support the concept of a more European flavor for the defense of Europe.
The NRF initiative could greatly contribute to closing some for the political gaps that have occurred between members. As with DCI and PCC, NRF will potentially catalyze even greater change for the organization. If the American proposal is actually able to generate a force, always ready to deploy beyond Europe's borders at short notice, it will have brought 21
st Century relevance to NATO.
The NATO alliance, with nineteen, soon to be twenty-six nation states, with different views and different domestic constituencies will always agree to disagree. Nevertheless, NATO remains the most successful alliance in the history of the world and will remain the European region's dominant security institution in the future.
THE EUROPEAN UNION
The transfer of responsibility for future European security development from the WEU directly to the EU set the stage for a new security initiative. At St. Malo the United Kingdom and France agreed that the EU "must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises". 38 The EU's decision to establish a "Headline Goal" for military capabilities in order to undertake the full range of Petersberg Tasks supports the EU's desire to develop a common European policy on security which would militarily support the Common Foreign and Security Policy. This would provide the EU the means and capabilities for the implementation of ESDP and was a departure from the work completed by the WEU on behalf of the EU with NATO cooperation.
ESDP, with the associated EURRF, was now the security initiative of choice that the EU used to replace the NATO sponsored ESDI. In order to continue the development of the ESDP, the EU also decided to develop arrangements for consultation with NATO and to ensure the necessary dialogue, with European NATO members who are not members of the EU on issues of security and defense.
The EU currently has fifteen-member nations of which ten are also members of NATO.
The relationship between the two organizations is progressing to one of cooperation and transparency.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The United States must remain involved in Europe and that involvement is in keeping with the current National Security Strategy of maintaining interests and alliances abroad. Long before the fall of the Wall, NATO had become more than just a military alliance. NATO had been a political/military organization that for years had allowed member states an additional option to solve issues between them. It is the only organization bridging the Atlantic that allows nineteen nations to meet regularly, discuss, and solve issues. The change in the threat to Europe, with the associated changes in the security architecture, does not mean the end to issues of mutual interest that the allies can solve together.
The EU is the Europe of the future. With the EU's population and economy approximating that of the United States, and with the projection of continued growth, the EU is likely to become a peer competitor to the United States. To ensure a continued mutually reinforcing relationship, the United States must establish stronger ties and linkages with the EU in the areas of economics and defense. There must be an understanding and acceptance of the autonomy of the EU by the United States. NATO must also continue to retain the wholehearted support of the United States, and evolve into a relationship with the EU that takes advantages of the strengths of the Union.
The United States has always supported Europe in the past, and will continue to in the future. It has invested billions of dollars in both reconstruction and in the defense of Europe.
For its part, Europe has not always reciprocated that support. To remain relevant, the Transatlantic link needs to be mutually supporting on both sides of the Atlantic. It should not be unreasonable for the United States to expect political and military support from the Europeans for major issues of concern to the United States. For all its faults, the United States has been a committed and loyal partner to Europe and during this critical period for the United States in the War on Terror, and conflict with Iraq, it is time for Europe and the EU to return that support.
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